Interpersonal pain perception is a fundamental and evolutionarily beneficial social process. While critical for navigating the social world, whether or not people rely on similar processes to perceive and respond to the harm of the non-human biological world remains largely unknown. Here we investigate whether neural reactivity toward the suffering of other people is distinct from or overlapping with the neural response to pain and harm inflicted upon non-human entities, specifically animals and nature. We used fMRI to measure neural activity while participants (n ¼15) perceived and reported how badly they felt for the pain or harm of humans, animals, and nature, relative to neutral situations. Neural regions associated with perceiving the pain of other people (e.g. dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral anterior insula) were similarly recruited when perceiving and responding to painful scenes across people, animals, and nature. These results suggest that similar brain responses are relied upon when perceiving the harm of social and non-social biological entities, broadly construed, and that activity within the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and bilateral anterior insula in response to pain-relevant stimuli is not uniquely specific to humans.
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Introduction
Around the world, people donate hundreds of billions of dollars each year to regional and international charities ranging from the American Red Cross and Doctors without Borders to the Nature Conservancy and World Wildlife Fund (Charities Aid Foundation, 2011). While a majority of donations fund efforts to directly relieve human suffering, people also routinely fund efforts to relieve nonhuman harm and suffering, such as animal rescue and nature conservation. Evolutionary psychologists have long argued that altruistic acts such as charitable donation emerge from the fundamental capacity for people to perceive and feel the suffering of others and act to alleviate that suffering (i.e., perception-action model of empathy, Preston and de Waal, 2002) .
A core network of brain regions underlies the recognition and interpretation of the pain of others (e.g. meta-analyses by Fan et al.
(2011) and Lamm et al. (2011)). Specifically, the dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) and bilateral anterior insular (AI) cortices are recruited when perceiving the pain of others across diverse contexts, such as physical pain or injury (Jackson et al., 2006; Lamm et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2004; Zaki et al., 2007) , painful facial expressions (Botvinick et al., 2005; Saarela et al., 2007) , social pain of exclusion (Masten et al., 2011) , and complex emotional pain (Cheon et al., 2011; Chiao et al., 2009; Mathur et al., 2010) . Although numerous prior studies have demonstrated and described the neural basis of the perception of human suffering, the specificity of the responding of this system is not well understood. Given the prevalence of costly helping behaviors directed to relieve the pain or harm of animals and nature, the neural processes recruited to perceive and respond to such non-human targets are of particular interest.
Environmental preservation campaigns often rely upon a bidirectional relationship between empathy and anthropomorphism, the human tendency to attribute agency or human characteristics (e.g., emotions and motivation) to non-human targets (Epley et al., 2007; Herrmann et al., 2010 
